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Abstract
The Ramón y Cajal Program promotes the hiring of top researchers in Spanish R&D cen-
ters and academic institutions. The centralized mechanism associated to the Program is
analyzed. The paper models it as a two-sided matching market and studies if it provides the
incentives to increase the quality of the researchers hired. We analyze the mechanism both
under complete and incomplete information. The comparison of the theoretical findings
with the available data points out that the mechanism provides poor incentives and does
not prevent collusion between research departments and candidates in the hiring process.
JEL Classification Numbers: C78, D78.
Keywords: Matching Markets; Preagreements; Implementation.
1 Introduction
Spanish Research Policy has been constantly under scrutiny, fostering an in-
tense debate that has been echoed by international scientific journals. Two
issues were especially raised: “the lack of sufficient funding and the existence
of social networks that regardless of the candidates’ scientific merit, systemati-
cally award positions to one of their members.” (Navarro and Rivero (2001), see
also Camacho (2001)). Many researchers attacked the inbreeding system that a
long-standing intellectual tradition with supporting empirical results (see, for in-
stance, Eisenberg and Wells (2000) and Soler (2001)), links with poor scientific
productivity. Many advocated for drastic solutions: “... first, every position
should be advertised internationally; second, there should be no local members
on appointment committees; and third, lecturers or full professors with low sci-
entific productivity should not serve on committees that appoint professorships.”
(Soler (2001)). In addition, the Spanish academic world has been repeatedly ac-
cused of hostility towards researchers who had completed their scientific training
abroad (see Ferrer (2000)).
After April 2000 elections, a reshaping of the whole Science and Technol-
ogy policy domain took place. A R&D committee was created to evaluate the
situation. The findings substantially agreed with the mentioned critiques. The
committee pointed out the lack of meritocracy in researchers’ selection and the
high incidence of endogamic practices as reasons for recruitment distortions.
It also remarked that the labor market presented serious problems regarding
careers opportunities and long-term perspectives.
An ambitious National R&D Plan was expected to operate, but only at the
end of 2000, because of pressures from Universities representatives, a new instru-
ment was put on the agenda, the Ramón y Cajal Program. The Program was
designed to overcome recruitment distortions. It was intended to provide sub-
sidies to public research centers for hiring researchers. The instrument selected
was a partially funded 5 years contract1. The objective of the Program was to
identify the best quality researchers and promote their employment within the
Spanish R&D system. The Ramón y Cajal Program attempted to introduce
a competitive and centralized selection of the applicants through an objective
evaluation of their merits and potentialities realized by a governmental agency
(see also Bosch (2001) and Sanz Menénedez and al. (2003)). The design of
the assigning procedure involved a complex bargaining stage between the main
actors involved: the Ministry of Technology, the direct responsible of the Pro-
gram, the Ministry of Education, having regulatory powers on Universities, the
Universities, legal and accounting advisers and aspirant researchers. Each one of
them tried to put its particular objectives across. The Ministry was concerned
about selecting the best researchers, the universities feared an attempt to weak-
ening their independence and the researchers expressed the need of stabilization
and of improvements of their working conditions (for a detailed account see Sanz
Menéndez (2003)).
1Each Ramón y Cajal contract is financed in decreasing terms during the five years. The
first year the entire burden is on the Ministry, the last year it is on the department.
1
In this paper we analyze the mechanisms used to match researchers and
research departments within the Program in its two main versions. The origi-
nal matching procedure has been used, with no great adjustments for the first
three years of the Program. After public expressions of concern about its per-
formance, the procedure was redesigned for the fourth edition. Our aim is to
provide insights on the ability of the mechanisms to carry out its objective.
We explore if the different interests that influenced the design undermined the
goal of incorporating the most promising researchers into the Spanish R&D sys-
tem. We compare the mechanism objectives with its performance, through an
analysis that is both theoretical and empirical.
We present a bilateral matching model that describes the main features of
the assignment mechanism. We derive predictions compatible with the data
available. We explain why the first model provided poor incentives and needed
a redesign. The new matching mechanism can solve part of the problems found
in the previous one.
To provide an intuition for these findings, we need to describe the procedure
used with minor variations in the first triennium. Initially, each research depart-
ment was endowed with a quota of researchers, which is the maximum number
of researchers they were allowed to hire. Any researcher who wanted to apply
for Ramón y Cajal Contracts had to contact the department or the departments
she would like to join and to ask for a preliminary acceptance. To get it, each
applicant had to provide the department with a scientific curriculum and a de-
tailed research proposal. The applicants who had been preliminary accepted by
at least one department, were evaluated for a Ramón y Cajal contract, by a
panel of national and international specialists in each field. They had to rank
the applicants in each field up to fill the number of financed contracts. Once the
lists of researchers entitled to financed contracts was published, the researchers
had to choose which departments to join compatibly with the preacceptances
and the ranking. The top ranked applicant in each research area decided which
department to join, among the ones that had previously accepted her. The
other applicants could choose among the departments that had accepted them
and had not filled all positions with better ranked researchers. At this stage,
the departments were passive. Each one had to hire all applicants preaccepted
in the preliminary stage up to complete the number of financed positions as-
signed. If at the end of this round all acceptable applicants got a position the
procedure ended. Otherwise, in a second round of the matching procedure, the
departments left with unfilled positions were asked to consider the researchers
unmatched after the first round. If a department and a researcher agreed they
were matched together. This second round was informal. In the first edition
of the Program, almost all matchings ended with the first assignment. Also,
in most of this second round matchings the researcher finally decide to opt out
without signing any contract.
The matching procedure resembled the Gale-Shapley algorithm with appli-
cants proposing and departments assuming as preferences the official ranking
on the preliminary accepted applicants. We prove that the original procedure
was unable to reconcile a competitive and meritocratic selection of the appli-
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cants with department’s co-responsibility. The mechanism aimed at creating
incentives for departments to hire top researchers. The coordination between
departments and researchers prevented this objective. The procedure gave
departments the possibility of vetoing any applicant through the preliminary
acceptance phase. Therefore, departments and applicants had possibilities to
collude. For example, any department could have decided to accept only the
applicants who had applied only to this department. An applicant who did not
get approval by at least one institution did not enter the selection. In conclusion
the possibility to create a large set of collusive equilibria existed (Proposition 2).
Institutions and applicants were able to jointly manipulate the mechanism and
make the centralized selection procedure irrelevant to the outcome (Theorem
1).
In Spain most research departments’ priority is either to settle researchers
already working on short-term contracts or to hire researchers they already
know. Therefore, academic merit was not departments’ main concern, at the
beginning of the Program. Given this preferences, once the applicants with
financed contracts are known, the matching is independent of the ranking of
financed researchers. Therefore, the mechanism does not create incentives in
hiring top researchers if by “creating incentive” we mean inducing the depart-
ment to internalize the meritocratic ranking provided by the Committee in each
field. It does not produce changes in departments’ choices following the ranking.
This is because it was indifferent for the departments to hire the best or the
second-best applicant. Even worse, there was a problem of constrained eligibil-
ity. The procedure only guaranteed that researchers hired were the best among
those that applied because only they will be financed but no all applicants can
be evaluated. In particular, an applicant alien to the system might have had
problems to get the preacceptance she needs. Nevertheless, it was appealing for
departments to take part in the Program because it reduced the financial load
of new long-term contracts. It also favored researchers’ objectives by improving
their labor conditions and stabilization perspectives.
Because of such concerns about the performance of the mechanism a new
procedure has been in place since the fourth edition (2004). The new proce-
dure is simpler and removes the preliminary acceptance stage. Each researcher
interested to enter the selection must send a unique scientific curriculum and
research proposal to the Ministry. The applicants are ranked and the best are
granted with a financed contract conditioned on final matching with a research
department. Then departments and researchers have to settle agreements in a
decentralized way. The contracts of the applicants who signed an agreement are
confirmed, the rest are withdrawn. The new mechanism does not prevent any
applicant from being evaluated by the Commission, and reduces considerably
the application costs. We will see along the paper that it does not prevent col-
lusion between centers and applicants, because assignments are decentralized.
The main limits seem to be the possible incompatibilities between applicants
and research centers (Proposition 4). If the academic world is already collusive
(see Navarro and Rivero (2001)), it might deter outsiders’ entry. Still, without
any doubt it is an improvement with respect to the old matching mechanism,
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because it prevents low ranked applicants to be financed through the Program.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we present the formal model. In
Section 3 we study the sequential game that models the mechanism used in the
first edition by the Ramón y Cajal Program. We explore the strategic incentives
of the players. We characterize the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPE
from now on) outcomes that results to have particular stability properties. The
outcome set only depends on agents’ preferences and on the number of positions
assigned to each department. It is not responsive to the order in which the
Committee ranks the applicants (Theorem 1). In Section 3.6 we analyze the
mechanism in use since the fourth edition of the Program. We show that, while
the outcome is not independent of the ranking, it is still possible that research
departments and applicants collude (Proposition 4).
In Section 4 we introduce informational incompleteness in the original model.
We would like to know if the lack of information can change departments’ atti-
tude towards meritocracy. With this purpose in mind, we simplify the prefer-
ences: we assume that each department only distinguishes between acceptable
and not acceptable applicants. This is a charitable assumption: it is equivalent
to postulate that departments assume the ranking on the set of their acceptable
researchers. Further, we assume that each department, given the information
each researcher sends to it, is able to discover the relative ranking of its ap-
plicants. If uncertainty affects only the ranking then it does not produce any
incentive effect (Corollary 3). If the uncertainty is on agents’ preferences, two
sources of instability emerge. One stems from the cut of poorly ranked re-
searchers, the other one is manipulative. We see that both such instabilities
cause inefficient outcomes in which some contracts are not assigned. Our data
show that the number of contracts signed between researchers and departments
in the second round was small. Therefore, either such uncertainty did not exist
or the mechanism induces agents to share the information they need to prevent
the inefficiencies.
In Section 5 the data available on the first call of the Program is analyzed.
We show how uncertainty affected applicants. A small number of applicants
applied to more than one research department, despite the costs of presenting
different research proposals. This behavior can be explained in our model as an
effect of incomplete information on other agents’ preferences. Most applicants
were well-informed about the market, but some “outsiders” did not know the
possibility they had of entering it but they were confident in their possibilities
of being assigned with a contract, once preaccepted by some department.
The study of sequential matching mechanism under perfect and complete
information is not new in the literature even with few examples as Alcalde et al.
(1998), Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000) and (2005). Our model apparently
shares features of the sequential mechanism described by Alcalde and Romero-
Medina (2005). There, each applicant can apply to one department according
to some priority order and the SPE outcome is the applicants’ optimal stable
matching, which is independent of any initial order. First, in our model, the pre-
liminary acceptance phase gives departments larger strategic possibilities (that
is, veto power or the possibility to exclude candidates). Then, each researcher
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can apply to any number of departments, fact that could produce instabilities, if
applications weren’t costly (see Example 2). Therefore, the SPE outcomes set is
larger. We deal with a more general problem in which the matching procedure
is restricted by the scarcity of contracts with respect to departments’ wishes.
Our mechanism can be seen also as a generalization to the many-to many-case
of the model analyzed by Sotomayor (2003). She presents a one-to-one match-
ing model where departments can preliminary accept any number of aspirants.
Then, each applicant has to select, in a given order, one department among the
ones who have accepted her and are still unmatched. She proves that the stable
set is implemented in Nash equilibrium.
Roth and Rothblum (1999) and Ehlers (2004) consider the incentives appli-
cants have under incomplete information in misrepresenting their preferences
when the Gale and Shapley mechanism is used and information is symmetric.
They show that when information is symmetric they cay can at best have in-
centives to truncate their preferences list. For a game-theoretic analysis the two
main references are Ordoñez de Haro and Romero-Medina (2004), who study
a sequential hiring game similar to the one analyzed in Alcalde et al. (1998)
and Pais (2005), who studies a particular set of equilibria of the Gale Shapley
algorithm under incomplete and symmetric information.
2 The model
We consider a bilateral matching market with k research departments (or de-
partments) and f ≥ k applicant researchers. Let D = {d1, ..., dk} be the set
of the research departments and let R = {r1, ..., rf} be the set of applicant
researchers. Each d ∈ D is endowed with a complete, strict, transitive pref-
erence relation, Pd on 2R, where 2R is the set of subsets of R, which is the
set of all possible research groups. For every S, S0 ∈ 2R, SPdS0 means that d
prefers to employ research group S to researchers group S0. If S = ∅ we say
that S0 is unacceptable to d, meaning that d would prefer not to hire any new
researcher rather than hire group S0. Given Pd and S ∈ 2R, the choice set
Chd(S) is the research group that d would like to hire most when S is avail-
able, formally Chd(S) = supPd{S0 : S0 ⊂ S}. For all r, r0 ∈ R, we write rPdr0
instead of {r}Pd {r0}. For each d ∈ D d’s quota, qd is the maximum number
of researchers that d is willing to employ, formally qd = max `{S : SPd∅}2 .
Set qi = qdi and q = (q1, ..., qk). Each researcher r has complete, strict and
transitive preferences Pr on D ∪ {r}. For every d, d0 ∈ D, dPrd0 means that r
would prefer to be employed by d rather than by d0. Any department d such
that rPrd is said to be unacceptable to r, which means that r would prefer to
stay unemployed rather than join department d. If dPrr, d is said to be ac-
ceptable to r. In the paper we make also use of a cardinal representation of
Pr , ur : D ∪ {r} → R. Let P = (Pd1 , ..., Pdk , Pr1 , ..., Prf ) denote a preference
profile. The triple M = (D,R,P ) is called matching market.
2For any set S, `S denotes the cardinality of S.
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Definition 1 A matching on (D,R) is a mapping µ : D ∪ R → 2R ∪ D,such
that, for every d ∈ D and r ∈ R:
(1) µ(d) ∈ 2R and µ(r) ∈ D ∪ {r}.
(2) µ(r) = d if and only if r ∈ µ(d).
Let µ be a matching on (D,R) and let M = (D,R,P ) be a matching mar-
ket. With M(D,R) we denote the set of matchings on (D,R). With abuse of
notation, for all S ⊂ D, µ(S) denotes
[
d∈S
µ(d).
Definition 2 The matching µ is individually rational for d ∈ D if rPd∅ for
each r ∈ µ(d) or µ(d) = ∅; µ is individually rational for r ∈ R if µ(r)Prr or
µ(r) = r.
Definition 3 The matching µ is blocked by a pair (d, r) ∈ D × R if dPrµ(r)
and r ∈ Chd(µ(d) ∪ {r}}.
Definition 4 µ is stable in market (D,R,P ) if (1) `µ(d) ≤ qd for all d ∈ D
(2) µ is individually rational for all agents and (3) µ does not have any blocking
pair.
In words a matching µ is stable if there are not a department d and an
applicant r such that r does not belong to µ(d) but r would prefer to join d
rather than µ(r) and d would choose to have r in its research group if it was
available together with µ(d).
Definition 5 Given a bilateral matching market M = (D,R,P ) the stable set
of M , denoted by Γ(M) is the set containing the matchings that are stable in
market M .
In general the stable set may be empty. This is why the literature has focused
on the restriction that researchers are seen as substitutes. More precisely, a
department’s preferences are substitutable if it wants to hire a researcher even
when other researchers become unavailable.
Definition 6 Let d ∈ D. The preference relation Pd is said to be substitutable
if for each S ∈ 2R and for all r, r0 ∈ S, r 6= r0, whenever r ∈ Chd(S) then
r ∈ Chd(S − {r0}).
If all departments have substitutable preferences we say that preferences
are substitutable. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) have shown that, under this
hypothesis, the deferred acceptance algorithm produce either the department-
optimal or the researcher-optimal stable matching, depending on whether the
departments or the students make the offer.
Substitutability is the most general condition, known in the literature, which
assures the non emptiness of the stable set. There are other additional properties
that hold in the case of one-to-one matchings or under responsiveness (see Roth
and Sotomayor (1990)), but not under substitutability. In particular, in the
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former cases the set of unmatched agents is the same in all stable matchings,
a property that we need to prove Proposition 4. A general condition under
which this property holds joins substitutability and separability with respect
to departments’ quotas (Martinez and al (2000)). Preferences are separable
whenever only adding acceptable students makes any given set of worker a
better one. Preferences are quota q-separable if the property holds only with
respect to subsets having less than q elements. Formally:
Definition 7 Let d ∈ D and let q > 0 be a natural number. The preference
relation Pd is said to be q-separable if for all S ∈ 2R:
`S < q, r /∈ S : rPd∅⇔ S ∪ {r}PdS.
`S > q ⇒ ∅PdS.
All along the paper, we assume that each department d, has substitutable
and quota qd-separable preferences3.
In our analysis we compare the preferences of the departments with a rank-
ing T over R. T , according to the Government’s views, evaluates researchers’
merits. If a department evaluates’ research group according to T , we say that
its preferences are meritocratic. More precisely a department has meritocratic
preferences if she would prefer to hire researcher r rather than r0, if and only if
r is better ranked than r0 according to T . And this, independently of the other
components of the research group.
Definition 8 Let T be a strict order on R. Let P be a profile of strict pref-
erences on 2R ∪ {d}. Department d’s preferences are T-meritocratic if, for all
r, r0 ∈ R ∪ {∅} and for all S ∈ 2R such that `S ≤ qd − 1
S ∪ {r}PdS ∪ {r0}⇔ rTr0.
In other words, Pd is meritocratic if they are responsive to T . In particular,
T -meritocratic preferences are substitutable and quota q-separable.
Finally, let us recall the notion of subgame perfect implementation in a
matching market framework. Let D and R be two disjoint and non-empty sets
of departments and researchers, respectively.
Definition 9 Let Φ be a class of matching markets and let F : Φ³M(D,R).
An extensive form mechanism (D,R,Γ) implements F in Subgame Perfect Equi-
librium if (1) for each (D,R,P ) ∈ Φ and for each µ ∈ F (D,R,P ) there exists
a SPE of the game (D,R,Γ, P ) yielding µ as outcome (2) each SPE outcome of
(D,R,Γ, P ) belongs to F (D,R,P ).
Throughout the paper, we consider equilibria in pure strategies only.
3Although, all results until Proposition 4 hold under substitutability only, unless stated
otherwise.
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3 The mechanisms
In this section we introduce the two matching mechanisms that we analyze in
the paper. The first one models the matching procedure which was used in the
three first editions of the Program. We call it the "old mechanism". It needs
a preliminary acceptance of the applicant from each of the departments she is
applying to. The “new mechanism” has been used since the fourth edition.
In this new procedure the applicants send their applications to the Ministry
without preacceptance.
3.1 The old mechanism
In a preliminary stage each research department communicates to the Ministry
its scientific projects in some areas and asks for some contracts to be financed.
The Ministry assigns to each department a maximum number of contracts. The
positions offered are linked to the specific projects presented by the departments.
Let ni be the number of financed contracts that are assigned to department
di. N =
Pk
i=1 ni is the maximum number of new contracts to financed. Set
n = (n1, ..., nk). We assume that the number of positions and projects to be
financed at each department is given and public knowledge. In the same way
we assume that the Commission’s ranking criteria are known and they can be
summarized by a strict order T , on R. Then the matching takes place as a five
stage game.
Stage 1: Researchers’ Preacceptance Applications. Each
applicant asks to some departments the preacceptances for joining
them. Joint with each application, the applicant must send a de-
tailed research project related with one presented to the Ministry
by the department itself. The application must specify also ap-
plicants’ preferences on the participant institutions4. Then each
application presents a cost for the applicant. We introduce it in
her utility function as a linear term. Let ψrd be the cost that r
faces in applying to d. We assume 0 < ψrd for all r ∈ R, for all
d ∈ D and ψrd < ur(d) whenever ur(r) < ur(d). For each r ∈ R let
D1(r) be the set of departments r applied to. For each d ∈ D let
R1(d) = {r : d ∈ D1(r)} be the set of researchers applying to depart-
ment d. Denote m1R = {D1(r)}r∈R the action profile for researchers
at stage 1. With abuse of notation m1R denotes the applications
received by departments which is {R1(d)}d∈D.
Stage 2: Departments Preacceptance Decision. Each depart-
ment accepts or rejects the demands it receives. For each d ∈ D
let R2(d) ⊂ R1(d) the set of researchers preaccepted by department
d. For each r ∈ R. D2(r) ⊂ D1(r) be the set of departments that
4The order provided has only informative purpose. It does not compel agents to conform
to their revealed preferences. It seems that the organization used it to arrange the residual
matchings.
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has accepted r. Set m2D = {R2(d)}d∈D. Each department, d which
has accepted at least one researcher, communicates R2(d) to the
ministry.
Stage MR: Ministry Ranks Preaccepted Researchers. The
result of this process is a ranking on ∪ki=1R2(di), formally the re-
striction of T to ∪ki=1R2(di). We denote the ith ranked researcher
by riT or r
i when no ambiguity is possible.
Stage 3: First Assignment. The researchers who have been ac-
cepted by at least one department are assigned, until N positions are
filled. Priority is given to the best ranked applicants. Researcher r1
is assigned to the department she chooses among the ones in D2(r1).
For i ≤ N , ri is assigned to the department she chooses among the
ones that have some free positions in D2(ri), if any. The rest re-
main unmatched. Each researcher accepted by some department
must choose a department if at least one among the ones that ac-
cepted her has some free positions. The result of such a process is
a matching µ1. If at least one researcher is unmatched and at least
one university has some unfilled positions, the procedure goes to the
fourth stage. Otherwise the matching process ends and µ = µ1is
the resulting matching. For i = 1, ..., k let n0i = ni − `µ1(di), be the
number of department di’s unfilled positions.
Stage 4: Second Preacceptance Decision. For any department
di such that n0i > 0 the ministry asks to it to submit a new set R4(di),
of acceptable researchers among the ri (i ≤ N) not matched under
µ1. Let T 0 be the restriction of the ranking T to such applicants.
For each such ri, let D4(ri) be the set of departments that accepted
ri.
Stage 5: Second Assignment. All researchers ri such that
D4(ri) 6= ∅ are assigned to the departments following the procedure
used in Stage 3. Applicant r1T´ 0 is assigned to the department she
chooses among the ones that have some free positions in D4(r1T ), if
any exists. At step i if some empty position is left and if some appli-
cant is not yet assigned to any department applicant riT 0 is assigned
to the department she chooses among the ones that have some free
positions in D4(rT 0). A second matching µ2 is concluded involving
the not yet assigned researchers. The process ends at this point: the
researchers matched to some department at the end of Stage 3 are
assigned by such an institution, the other ones are assigned by µ2.
For i ≤ N set µ(ri) = µ1(ri) if µ1(ri) ∈ D, µ(ri) = µ2(ri) otherwise.
Set µ(r) = r otherwise. At any point of the process each applicant
can leave the game.
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3.2 The extensive form of the game with complete infor-
mation
We assume that ni ≤ qi for all i, which is consistent with the fact than depart-
ments cannot be forced to hire any researcher against their will. Let (D,R,P )
be a matching market and let n = (n1, ..., nk). For each d ∈ D let Pnd be prefer-
ences that coincide with Pd except for the fact that all sets of cardinality larger
than nd are not acceptable. Observe that if Pd are substitutable and qd-quota
separable then Pnd are substitutable and nd-quota separable. For each r ∈ R let
Pnr = Pr. Finally, set P
n = (Pnd1 , ..., P
n
dk , P
n
r1 , ..., P
n
rf ). P
n is called the effective
preference profile.
For i = 1, ..., 5, zi we denote a node of the game belonging to stage i. Zi
denotes the set of stage i nodes. We assume that at each node z, all agents z
belongs to, have complete information of what happened before. Each node of
the second stage z2, is characterized by the applications strategies leading to it.
LetR(z2) be the set of researchers who sent at least one application and letD(z2)
be the set of departments that received at least one application. Pn(z2) denotes
the profile of preferences in which departments’ preferences coincide with the
ones of Pn and researcher r’s preferences Pnr (z2) ranks departments in the same
order as Pn, but each department she did not applied to is not acceptable. The
matchings belonging to Γ(D(z2), R(z2), Pn(z2)) is called z2-stable. Let µRz2 be
the researchers’ optimal stable matching for (D(z2), R(z2), Pn(z2)).
Definition 10 The reduced game is the extensive form game that ends with
the first assignment.
For each z4 let D(z4) be the set of departments d that filled less than nd
positions. Let R(z4) be the set of idoneous researchers who did not sign for any
department. If D(z4) = ∅ or if R(z4) = ∅ the first matching is the definitive
one. Let µ1z4 be the first matching at z4. Define the profile of preferences
Pn(z4) as follows: for each d ∈d(z4) for all S, S0 ⊂ R(z4), SPnd (z4)S0 if and only
if (µ1z4(d)∪S)P
n
d (µ
1
z4(d)∪S
0), researchers’ preferences coincide with the original
one. If Pnd (z2) is substitutable and nd-quota substitutable and z4 follows z2 then
Pnd (z4) is substitutable and
¡
nd − `µ1z4(d)
¢
-quota substitutable.
The outcome matching is be the union of a first matching and of a residual
matching µ = µ1z4 ∪ µ
2
z5 where z4 is a node of the fourth stage and z5 is a
terminal node of the fifth stage following z4.
Definition 11 The full game is the game that ends with the second assign-
ment.
3.3 Analysis
We show that the assignment procedure does not prevent collusion between the
two sides of the market. There exists a set of SPE outcomes which depends only
on the total number of contracts assigned and on agents’ preferences and not on
the ministerial ranking. Such an outcome set is “stable” compatibly with the
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limit imposed by the number of contracts assigned to each department. In such
equilibria the departments do not compete for the best applicants according
to the ranking, they compete for their favorite researchers. The research de-
partments can exclude any researcher by not accepting her at the second stage.
If the ranking used by the Committee and the preferences of the departments
differ substantially any researcher could be excluded in the matching because
no department gave her the preacceptance. In this case she would never appear
in the ranking compiled after the second stage. We show there are equilibrium
outcomes that can result only from contracts signed at the end of the fifth stage
and build on “redundant acceptances”. We suggest (Example 1) that such equi-
libria could hurt some departments. It might explain why a low number of fifth
stage contracts were signed in the first edition of the Program. It could be the
result of a departments’ attempt of reducing the hurting matchings. This is the
reason why we consider the reduced game that yields sharper predictions. All
SPE outcomes are stable, considering the departments’ preferences as shaped
by quota. Furthermore applicants’ equilibrium strategies reduce to a unique
application, which resembles the data of the first application.
The result does not longer hold if one assumes zero costs of application.
In such a case unstable SPE equilibria could occur because of multiple appli-
cations and incoherent behavior of the departments. Unstable equilibria build
on departments that in subgames starting at the second stage use a different
acceptance policy even when they receive the same set of applications. We first
note that any preaccepted applicant has as dominant strategy, at each node she
owns at the third and at the fourth stage to accept the best offer it holds. This
must be her SPE strategy.
Proposition 1 Let r ∈ R. At the third stage of the reduced and of the full game
she has a unique dominant strategy: to join her favorite department among the
ones that have preaccepted her and have vacant positions. It holds both for the
reduced and for the full game. In the fifth stage of the full game she has a unique
dominant strategy: to join her favorite available department.
Proof. The proof is trivial for the reduced game and for the fifth stage of
the full game. For the third stage of the full game it suffices to observe that r
is called to play at most once between the third and the fifth stage.
3.4 The lack of meritocratic incentives
First we show that the procedure is not immune to agents’ manipulation. We
prove that the set of SPE includes a “stable set”, which is independent of the
ranking elaborated by the Ministry. It follows that the mechanism does not
provide enough incentives for hiring the best applicants. Further it might fos-
ter the collusion among departments in order to end the game after the first
assignment. The SPE outcome sets of the full and of the reduced game contain
the “stable set” Γ(D,R,Pn), which is independent of any ranking T of the ap-
plicants. Once the number of financed contracts is known, it depends only on
agents’ preferences. The result does not build on application costs.
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Proposition 2 Let n be given, let P be a profile of preferences and let µ ∈
Γ(D,R,Pn). Then there exists a SPE of full game yielding µ as outcome, in
which all matchings are concluded after the first assignment. Such strategies are
SPE of the reduced game that yield µ as outcome, too.
Proof. Let µ ∈ Γ(D,R,Pn). Consider the following strategy profile: Stage
1: Each r applies µ(r). Stage 2: At each z2 ∈ Z2, department d accepts the ap-
plicants r ∈ µRz2(d). Stage 3: Each researcher plays her dominant strategy. Stage
4: At each z4 ∈ Z4, department d accepts the applicants r ∈ µRz4(d). Stage 5:
Each researcher plays her dominant strategy. Given such a profile of strategies,
at each z2 ∈ Z2 no researcher is accepted by more than one department. The
stability of µRz2 in (D(z2), R(z2), P
n(z2)) and of µRz4 in (D(z4), R(z4), P
n(z4)),
for all z2 and for all z4 imply subgame perfection. The same strategy profile,
“cut” after the third stage constitutes a SPE of the reduced game and both
yield µ as outcome.
Remark 1 The strategy profile used in the proof of Proposition 2 is consistent
with the empirical evidence found on the first edition of the Program (see Section
5). Most applicants presented applications to few departments. In addition,
most institutions preaccepted only the researchers that they would have hired.
Furthermore, almost all matchings were settled at the end of the third stage. In
the contracts closed at the fifth stage typically the applicant postponed the time
of join the department and finally opted out. It seems that agents deliberately
chose not to use stage 4 and 5.
3.5 The reduced game
The equilibrium constructed in the proof of Proposition 2 ends with the first
matching. Not all equilibria conclude with a first definitive matching. More
important, there are equilibrium outcomes that cannot be result of strategies
ending with the first matching if costs are strictly positive. They build on “re-
dundant acceptances”. In these equilibria some department d gives a redundant
preacceptance to an applicant r that it is not going to hire. Researcher r will
finally join a department d0 which accepts her as residual. Any applicant that
d0 prefers to r has been excluded from the ranking due the acceptance policies
of the other departments, and they do not enter the process due to application
costs. Department d0 would be strictly better off, if no researcher had been
redundantly accepted. Therefore, if a fifth stage matching is not redundant it
hurts some departments. The following example formalizes the intuition and
shows that not all SPE end with the first assignment.
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Example 1
Let k = 2 and let f = 3. Let n1 = n2 = 1 and N = 2. Let 0 < ψ
r
d < ur(d)
for all d and for all r. Let T : r1, r,2 , r3, Pd1 = r1, r2 Pd2 = r3, r2, Pr1 = d1,
Pr2 = d2, d1, Pr3 = d2. Consider the following strategy profile: First Stage:
D1(r1) = {d1}, D1(r2) = {d1}, D1(r3) = ∅. Second Stage: let d1 accepting r1
and/or r2 whenever at least one of them applies. Let d2 not accepting anyone
else. Let d2 always accepting r3, whenever she applies Let d2 accepting r2
whenever r3 has not applied to any university at the first stage. Let d2 rejecting
r2 when r2 and r3 apply. Let d3 not accepting any applicant different from r3
and r4. Third Stage: let researchers play their dominant strategies. Fourth
Stage: for each z4 let department d accepting only the applicants in µRz4(d) (see
Proposition 2). Fifth Stage: let researchers play their dominant strategies. The
described strategies yield the following matching, µ as outcome.
d1 d2 ∅
r1 r2 r3
They constitute a SPE. It is easily checked that d1, r1, d2 and r2 behave
optimally in any subgame. If r3 deviates, it is sufficient to consider the case
in which she applies to d2. By applying to d2 the three researchers would be
preaccepted, r3 would not get any position because there are only two positions
available and two better researched have been preaccepted.
Now we prove that there exits no SPE yielding µ, where all the agreements end
at the first assignment. Buy contradiction assume that there exists one. Then,
it must be the case that r4 did not apply to any department, otherwise she
would pay positive costs. Further r3 applied only to d3. Otherwise consider
the following deviation for r3, D1(r3) = {d3}. In the subgame induced by
such deviation d3 accepts r3, because it is the unique acceptable application it
receives. Then such a deviation would be profitable for r3 because she would
save the costs of multiple applications.
In Example 1, the redundant acceptance of r3 by d2 forces r4 to be excluded
by the process. This hurts d3, which would prefer to hire r4 rather than d3 but
it cannot, because r4 entry is prevented by r3 redundant acceptance.
An assignation can end at the fifth stage only if some applicants have been ac-
cepted by a department, that fills all its positions with better ranked researchers
at the third stage. The redundant acceptances either hurt some departments
or the process could have been concluded at the third stage. Why should a
department preaccept an applicant whom it is not going to hire? Departments
could deliberately chose to collude and to play the reduced game only. It would
prevent unwanted assignations and it would be an equilibrium strategy, accord-
ing to Proposition 2. This is consistent with the fact that most of contracts
signed in the first edition of the Program (16 out of 802) were concluded at
the fifth stage. Therefore, we study the reduced game whose equilibrium set is
smaller and more appealing, at least for the departments. The reduced game
has no equilibrium outcomes outside the stable set. So they do not depend on
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the ranking used by the Ministry, but only on the number of financed contracts.
The introduction of the ranking alone cannot induce departments to compete
for the best researchers.
Theorem 1 For each n, the reduced game implements Γ(D,R,Pn) in SPE. In
all SPE each applicant applies to at most one department.
The result extends straightforwardly to the equilibria of the full game in
which all contacts are signed at the end of the third stage. From Theorem 1
and from Proposition 2 it follows that
Corollary 1 For each n the set of SPE outcomes in which contacts are signed
at the end of the third stage is Γ(D,R,Pn).
To proof Theorem 1 we need some preliminary Lemmas. The SPE allocations
are “ex-post” stable.
Lemma 1 Let z2 be second stage node where at most N researchers (D(z2) ≤
N) have applied. The game beginning at z2 implements the set of z2-stable
matchings, Γ(D(z2), R(z2), Pn(z2)) in SPE.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume D(z2) = D and R(z2) = R. We
first prove each matching µ, that is stable in (D,R,Pn(z2)) is an equilibrium
outcome. Consider the following strategies. For each d ∈ D let R2(d) = µ(d).
Let each r ∈ R playing her dominant strategy at each node of the game. No
researcher can profitably deviate. If some d deviates let µ0(d) be the outcome
matching, keeping fixed other agents’ strategies. Let r ∈ µ0(d))\µ(d). Then
dPr(z2)µ(r) as no applicant has been accepted by more than one department
different from d. The matching µ is stable in (D,R,P (z2)) so r /∈ Chd(µ(d) ∪
{r}). In particular, µ(d)Pd(z2)µ0(d). The matching µ is stable in (D,R,P (z2)),
so it cannot be the case that d can profitably deviate simply by not accepting
some applicants in µ(d). Then, no deviation is profitable for d.
We complete the prove by showing that each SPE outcome matching of z2 is
stable in (D,R,Pn(z2)). Let d ∈ D and assume that dPr(z2) µ(r) for some
r ∈ R. Consider the following deviation for d: R2(d) = Chd((µ(d) ∪ {r}),
where, as d preferences we consider Pd(z2). It must be the case that such
deviation produces a matching µ0 such that µ0(d) = Chd((µ(d) ∪ {r}) because
the applicants decide sequentially according to ranking T , and at any SPE each
one selects her best available offer at her turn. Then if r ∈ Chd(µ(d)∪ {r}) the
deviation would be profitable for d. Then µ is stable in (D,R,P (z2)).
The next result shows that, in any SPE in which researchers apply to one
department or none, the outcome is stable under the effective preferences, Pn.
Lemma 2 All SPE equilibria outcomes of the reduced game in which each
matched researcher applies to exactly one department are stable in (D,R,Pn).
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Proof. Let µ be an SPE outcome in which each researcher applies to exactly
one department. By contradiction, assume that (d, r) blocks µ in (D,R,Pn).
Consider the following deviation for r: she applies only to d and she conforms
to SPE strategies afterwards. In the subgame induced by such a deviation d
receives the applications of the agents in µ(d)∪ {r}. Given subgame perfection,
it must be the case that the deviation matches r with d, yielding a contradiction.
The main result follows.
Proof of Theorem 1. >From Lemma 2, it suffices to show that, at equi-
librium, all researchers apply to no more than one department. At equilibrium
no unmatched agent researcher to any department because of the costs. So, at
equilibrium no more than N researchers apply. To complete the proof, letm∗ be
an SPE yielding a matching µ∗ as outcome. Let {D∗1(r)}r∈R be the equilibrium
application profile. Let r∗ ∈ R and let d∗ ∈ D such that µ∗(r) = d∗. Let z2 be
the node in which each r 6= r∗ has applied to D∗1(r) and r∗ has applied to only
d∗. The matching µ∗ is stable in (D(z2), R(z2), Pn(z2)) and d∗ is r’s unique
stable partner in (D(z2), R(z2), Pn(z2)). By Lemma 1 if D∗1(r
∗) % {d∗} the de-
viation D1(r∗) = {d∗} would be profitable to r∗, because it would produce the
same matching as m∗ with a lower number of application so with lower costs.
Then it must be the case that D∗1(r) = {µ∗(r)} for all r ∈ R.
As it was to expect, the system performs correctly if the preferences of
the departments coincide with the ranking criteria. When preferences are T -
meritocratic there exists a unique stable matching in (D,R,Pn), µT . Matching
µT matches the best researcher to her favorite department, the second ranked
researcher to her favorite department among the ones that have empty positions
and so on.
Proposition 3 Let all departments’ preferences be T−meritocratic then the re-
duced game implements µT in SPE.
Proof. If researchers play their SPE strategy the best each department
can do at every z2 ∈ Z2 is to accept all applicants regardless of other de-
partments’ moves. So, in any SPE of z2 it must be as well as playing such a
strategy. Then, the SPE outcome of z2 must be the unique stable matching of
(D(z2), R(z2), P (z2)). Let then µ∗ be an SPE outcome of the game. Without
loss of generality let T = r1, ..., rN , .... By contradiction, assume that there
exists ri such that µ∗(ri) 6= µT (ri). Let ri be the best ranked of such applicants
which means µ∗(rj) 6= µT (rj) for j < i and µ∗(ri) 6= µT (ri). If dPrµT (ri) then
µT (d) ⊂ {r1, ..., ri−1} and `µ∗(d) = nd. Then µT (d) = µ∗(d) by hypothesis.
Therefore, ri can join any department d ∈
©
d : `µT (d) < nd
ª
by applying to d.
But ri’s most preferred department in this set is exactly µT (ri).
Remark 2 The result is independent of any assumption on costs.
When there are no application costs and preferences are not T meritocratic
the mechanism might produce unstable matchings. An unstable matching may
result at equilibrium if some agents apply to more than one department.
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Example 2
Let k = f = 3 and let ψrd = 0 for all r and for all d. Let n1 = n2 = n3 = 1.
Let Pr1 = d1, d2, d3, Pr2 = d2, d1, d3, Pr3 = d2, d3. Let Pd1 = r2, r1, r3, Pd2 =
r1, r3, r2, Pd3 = r3, r1, r2. Consider the following matching, µ.
d1 d2 d3
r1 r2 r3
It is blocked by (d2, r3) in (D,R,Pn), but it is an SPE outcome of the reduced
game. Consider the following strategies. Researcher r1 and r2: apply to {d1, d2}
at the first stage and use the strict dominant strategies at the third stage.
Researcher r3: applies to d3 at the first stage and uses the strict dominant
strategies at the third stage. At any z2 of the second stage d accepts only the
applicants in µRz2(d). It is easy to verify that such strategies constitute an SPE:
r1 and r2 have no profitable deviation as µ assign them to their first choice.
If r3 deviates she is matched to r3 whenever she includes it in her application,
otherwise she ends unmatched. The stability of µRz2 assures that no department
can profitably deviate from the described strategies at z2. So µ is a SPE outcome
of the reduced game. It can be easily seen that it is a SPE outcome of the full
game with no costs.
When the costs are positive and the information is complete no researcher
applies to more than one department, at equilibrium (Theorem 1). Multiple
applications create a coordination problem to departments. Even if a candidate
gets more than one preacceptance she can join only one department. On the
other side the example relies on an “incoherent” behavior on departments’ side.
In the subgames in which r3 applies to d2 while the other researchers behave
as in equilibrium d1 accepts only r2 even if it receives the same applications as
on the equilibrium path (by r1 and r2). A convenient behavioral assumption
on departments’ strategies would extend the stability result to the case of zero
costs. Matching µ can be sustained as an equilibrium of the full game without
costs, too.
It is not clear which kind of SPE outcomes can be sustained without costs:
it is larger than the set of stable matchings, but it is strictly contained in the set
of individually rational matchings5. The next example proves that there exists
individually rational matchings that are not SPE outcomes.
Example 3
Let k = f = 2. Let n1 = n2 = 1 and let N = 2. Let Pr1 = d1, d2,
Pr2 = d2, d1, Pd1 = r1, r2 and Pd2 = r2, r1. The following matching is IR (but
not stable)
d1 d2
r2 r1
5The point has been made by Jordi Massó.
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It cannot be sustained by any SPE of the reduced game, whatever is T . It can-
not be sustained by single application strategies because is not stable (Lemma
2). It cannot be sustained by multiple application strategies: each department
who receives more than one application would be better strictly better off by
accepting its favorite researcher only.
3.6 The New Mechanism
Concerns were publicly expressed on the effectivity of the old mechanism in
selecting the best researchers. At the same time, the fears of the universities of
losing their autonomy were lessening, so it was possible to reshape the assign-
ment procedure. The main innovation is the elimination of the preacceptances.
Under the new mechanism nobody is prevented from being ranked, if she chooses
to participate. Only one proposal is necessary to enter the selection. This re-
duces the application cost to the participants. On the other hand the matching
stage is completely decentralized. In this way the universities preserved their
independence in hiring new personnel.
Stage 1: Candidates’ application. Applicants simultaneously
send their scientific CV and a research proposal to the Ministry. Let
R1 be the set of agents who apply.
Stage MR: The Ministry ranks all applicants The first N =P
ni ranked researchers have the right to see their contract (eventu-
ally) financed through the Program. We call them idoneous. The
other students are definitively out of the Program.
Stage 2: Assignment. In a decentralized way the departments
and the idoneous applicants sign contracts. Each department di
cannot sign more than ni contracts with idoneous researchers. A
matching µ is agreed.
We assume the decentralized matching takes place as in the following way.
Once the set of idoneous researchers is known, each department reveals the
applicants it is willing to hire. Then, sequentially each researcher decides which
department to join among the ones that have admitted her and are left with
vacancies6. The mechanism is an extension of Sotomayor (2003) to the many-to-
one case and can be formally described as follows. Let N 0 ≤ N be the number of
idoneous researchers. Let ri1 , ..., riN0 the order in which researchers can choose
which department to sign for. This order agrees with the restriction of T to the
best N 0 applicants.
Stage 2.1 Each department d selects a subset R(d) ⊂
©
ri1 , ..., riN0
ª
.
Let D(r) be the set of departments that have accepted r.
6The main result of this section holds under a more general assumption on the decentralized
assignment process (see the Appendix).
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Stage 2.1.1 ri1 chooses a mate xi1 in D(ri1) ∪ {ri1}. Set µ1(ri1) =
xi1 µ
1(xi1) = {ri1} if xi1 ∈ D, set µ1(r) = r for all r 6= ri1 and set
µ1(d) = ∅ for all d 6= xi1 .
Stage 2.1.t (2 ≤ t ≤ N 0) rit chooses a mate dit in the setD(rit)\
©
d : `µ1(d) ≥ qd
ª
∪
{rit}. Set µt(rii) = dit , µt(dit) = µt−1(dii) ∪ {rit}, and µt(x) =
µt−1(x) for all x 6= ri1 , xit .
Set µ = µN 0 .
Let z be an initial node of the second stage and let R(z) be the set of
idoneous researchers at z. Let (D,R(z), Pn(z)) be the matching markets in
which researchers’ preferences are the original ones and let each department d’s
preferences, Pnd (z) to coincide with P
n on 2R\ {∅} and to rank as not accept-
able all subsets containing agents in R\R(z). We call a matching belonging to
Γ(D,R(z), Pn(z)), z-stable. The next result characterizes the SPE outcomes of
the subgames beginning at the second stage, extending the result of Sotomayor
(2003), to the many-to-one case.
Corollary 2 Let z2 be an initial node of the second stage. Then the game
starting at z2 implements the z2-stable set, Γ(D,R(z), Pn(z2)) in SPE stable
matching.
Proof. Observe that the subgame beginning at z2 is a subgame of the full
game, that begins at the fourth stage with the empty set and agents choosing
in the order ri1 , ..., riN0 . Then the claim follows from Lemma 1.
The main result about the new mechanism reveals the two faces of the coin.
The new system is positively responsive to the ranking. A good researcher can
enter and get the right to a financed contract. However, assignments are com-
pletely decentralized: it is impossible to guarantee her with a position according
to her preferences. In the worst of the cases, this possibility could deter her en-
try. The mechanism does not reward better ranked researchers: there is no
difference in being ranked first or N th7.
Proposition 4 Let T = r1, ..., rN , ...rf . Let ν ∈ Γ(D,R,Pn).
(i) In any SPE at most `ν(D) are employed.
(ii) Let `ν(D) ≥ N and let µ be a matching in which exactly N researchers
are employed. Let rj∗ be the worst ranked employed researcher. Let j∗ > N 8 .
The matching µ is an SPE outcome of the new mechanism if and only if µ
is stable in the market in which all non employed researchers are excluded
(D,µ(D), PD, Pµ(D)) and for all j < j∗ such that µ(rj) = rj, rj is single in
market (D,µ(D)\ {rj∗}) ∪ {rj} , PD, P(µ(D)\{rj∗})∪{rj}).
(iii) Let µ be a matching such that `µ(D) < N . Then µ is an SPE outcome of
the new mechanism if and only if µ is stable for (D,µ(D), PD, Pµ(D)) and for all
j such that µ(rj) = rj, rjis single in market (D,µ(D) ∪ {rj} , PD, P(µ(D)∪{rj}).
7Part (i), (ii) and (iii) of the claim hold also if costs are zero.
8 It is possible because better ranked researchers could have decided not to enter.
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(iv) Let participation costs to be strictly positive for each agent. At any SPE
the same set of N agents is matched. The set of SPE outcomes coincides with
the set of matchings described in (ii).
(v) Let `ν(D) ≤ N and let participation costs to be strictly positive for each
agent. The set of SPE outcomes of the new mechanism is Γ(D,R,Pn).
Proof. See Appendix A.
According to part (i), if the stable matchings of Γ(D,R,Pn) employ strictly
less than N researchers than some financed contracts will be wasted. Consider a
full employment equilibrium in which a poorly ranked researcher signs a financed
contract and some better researcher did not apply for the grant. According
to part (ii), it is because had the better researcher decided to participate in
the selection she would not have got any acceptable position (and a contract
would have been wasted). Part (iv) and (v) analyze the case of strictly positive
application costs: in this case any researcher who will not get any position does
not apply. If costs are null then some researcher might apply even if she knows
that she is not going to get any position. If she ranked between the best N
aspirants then some contracts will be wasted. The new mechanism does not
completely prevent collusion, because of the decentralized assignment. Anyway
it removes several collusive equilibria of the old mechanism as is proved in the
next example.
Example 4
Assume Let k = 3 and let f = 4. Let n1 = n2 = n3 = 1 and N = 3. T :
r1, r,2 , r3, r4 Pd1 = r2 Pd2 = r1, r3 Pd3 = r4, r3 Pr1 = d2 Pr2 = d1 Pr3 = d2, d3
Pr4 = d3 The unique stable matching of (D,R,P ) = (D,R,P
n) is µ:
d1 d2 d3 ∅
r2 r1 r4 r3
By Theorem 1 µ is the unique equilibrium of the reduced game. Only r1, r2, r4
are employed. By Proposition 4 µ cannot be sustained as a SPE outcome of the
new mechanism. Actually, the unique SPE outcome of the new mechanism is:
d1 d2 d3 ∅
r2 r1 r3 r4
Through the new mechanism we recover some efficiency, with respect to
T . This was one of the designers’ concerns. The new mechanism may act
exactly by preventing the formation of inefficient stable markets, preventing the
entry of poor researchers. Anyway, the mechanism cannot carry out the task
if preferences are too endogamic: researchers are excluded by the market itself
(from (ii) and (iii)), whatever is their position in T .
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4 More general information structure
In this section we relax the assumption of perfect and complete information and
we allow for a more general structure. Let S be the (finite) set of state of the
world. A state of the world, s is characterized by a ranking T (s) and a profile
of preferences, U(s) = (Ux(· | s))x∈R∪D. In addition each agent, x ∈ R ∪D has
a fixed prior distribution πx on S. An allocation is a function M from S to the
set of possible matchings.
The agents play one of the games described in the previous section. A path
in the game is a pair (s, h), where s ∈ S and h is an history of the actions
taken by the players. To any terminal path is associated an outcome matching
µ = µ(h, s).
An information set for a player x is a set, Ix of histories identifying those
paths player x is not able to distinguish. =x denotes x’s collection of information
set. Let Ix(s) to denote x’s information set at the beginning of the game.
Behavioral strategies for x ∈ R ∪D, σx, specify the actions taken by agents at
each information set. Let σ = (σx)x∈R∪D be a profile of strategies.
A profile of (behavioral) strategies, σ∗ is sequentially rational if, for all
x ∈ R ∪D, for all s ∈ S and for every information set Ix ∈ =x
Eπx [Ux(µ(σ∗, s))) | Ix] ≥ Eπx
£
Ux(µ(σ−x∗, σx, s)) | Ix
¤
for all σx.
where Eπx [·, s)] denotes the expectation operator with respect to to πx. Beliefs
are determined using Bayes’ Rule whenever it is possible. It is however necessary
to model beliefs outside the equilibrium path, which is if Ix has probability 0
under (σ∗, π), then an appropriate conditional distribution has to be assigned.
We use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) and Sequential Equilibrium (SE) as
equilibrium concepts. Observe that in the second case the information at any
information set must be consistent with initial information through Bayesian
updating.
4.1 The reduced old mechanism
Let T be the set of all possible rankings on R. Agent x’s information determines
a probability distribution ρx on T , where ρx(T ) = P
T=T (s)
πx(s | Ix(s)). Each
department d, once it receives the applications from the researchers in some
subset R1 of R, is able to determine the relative ranking among the members of
R1. Its information set at (s, h) can be then identified by Id = (R1, T|R1) where
T|R1 is the restriction of T to R1. Department d’s beliefs are a probability distrib-
ution πd(· | Id). We assume that the induced probability distribution on T ρx(· |
Id) is consistent with ρx for all Id. Let T d(Id) = ©T : T | R1(d) = T (Id)|R1(d)ª,
the set of rankings consistent with d’s information at Id’s. This induces a differ-
ential information structure. Departments are better informed than applicants
on the final ranking. Each department knows only the ranking of its applicants
but does not have detailed information about other participants’ positions on
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ranking. Pooling of all departments’ information would reveal the full ranking
on the applicants.
Remark 3 At the final stage of the game, all relevant information has already
been disclosed. Then, like in Proposition 1, each researcher has a strictly domi-
nant strategy: to accept the best offer she holds whenever she is called to choose.
The result holds at any equilibrium consistent with sequential rationality.
If µ is the outcome function, and (h, s) is a path, let Rd1(h, s) be the set of
researchers applying to d along that path. For all (h, s), (h0, s0) belonging to the
same information set Id, we have Rd1(h, s) = R
d
1(h
0, s0) = Rd1(Id). Rd2(h, s) =
Rd2(I
d) ⊂ Rd1(Id) denotes the set of researchers accepted by department d at
Id. Let T d(Id) be the a profile of preferences for d, responsive to the following
order on individuals.
rT d(Id)d⇔ r ∈ Rd2(h, s) for some (h, s) ∈ Id.
rT d(Id)r0 ⇔ rT (s)r0.
Such preferences are meritocratic at Id.
LetM(Id) be the matching market in which researchers have their original
preferences as in state s and each department d has preferences T d(Id). Let
µT (Id) be the unique stable matching in M(Id). Then the following result
holds.
Lemma 3 Let Id be an information set belonging to the second stage and let
researchers playing conforming to Proposition 1. Then for any (h, s) belonging
to Id, the outcome of (h, s) is µT (Id) at any SE and at any PBE.
Proof. Let r1T...TrN 0 , let N 0 ≤ N be the applicants who receive a financed
contract on path (h, s). Set d1 = maxP r1 (s)
©
d : rj ∈ Rd2(h, s)
ª
and, for all j ≤
N 0 − 1 set
dj+1 = maxP rj+1 (s)
©
d : rj ∈ Rd2(h, s), |{0 ≤ k ≤ j − 1 : d = dj−k}| < nd
ª
, with
the convention maxP r(s)∅ = r. Let dj be rj ’s partner at the end of h at state s.
Executing the deferred acceptance algorithm with departments applying, where
each department d is substituted by nd replicas in the order (d1, ..., dN 0), one
obtains the same matching. The first claim follows by taking into account that
the outcome of such procedure is the departments’ optimal stable matching in
M(h, s) for any order of application. The second claim follows by executing the
deferred acceptance algorithm with applicants applying the order defined by the
ranking.
Then, departments’ strategy is equivalent to “revealing” a profile of pref-
erences from a restricted set. If the application stage does not convey more
information than the initial one to the departments and if preferences are pub-
lic knowledge the conclusions of previous section applies. Analogous result holds
in the case of complete information.
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Corollary 3 Assume that the information is complete on agents’ preferences
and the informational structure is the same than in Section 3.1
(i) the full game weakly implements the stable set in PBE and in SE
(ii) the reduced game fully implements the stable set in PBE and in SE.
Information asymmetries may have a different impact on the analysis if and
only if it affects agents’ preferences and not only the ranking.
In order to make the formal analysis simpler we restrict our attention to
preference profiles such that the departments can only differentiate between
acceptable and not acceptable applicants. They only care in filling their posi-
tions with acceptable researchers. They assume the official ranking on the set
of their acceptable researchers, but it does not mean that their preferences are
meritocratic.
Let udA (s) be d’s utility from an acceptable researcher at s ∈ S and let
udNA(s) be d’s utility from an unacceptable researcher at s ∈ S. Let ud(∅, s) be
the utility of not hiring any researcher at state s ∈ S. With no loss of generality
we assume ud(∅, s) = 0. Let udNA (s) < 0 < udA(s). Let Ad = Ad(s) be the set
of acceptable researchers for department d at s ∈ S. Set
ud(R0, s) =
¯¯
Ad(s) ∩R0
¯¯
udA(s) + |R0\A(d, s)|udNA(s), R0 6= ∅, |R0| ≤ qd.
ud(R0, s) < ud(∅, s) if |R0| > qd.
We will say that a department strategy is essentially dominant if it is domi-
nant in the game where the researchers play according to the strategy in propo-
sition 1. In Appendix B we prove that it is essentially dominant, for all depart-
ments, to accept all acceptable researchers.
Proposition 5 Accepting all acceptable applicants is the unique essentially dom-
inant departments’ strategy. Furthermore it is the unique departments’ strategy
which resists to the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
4.2 Core stability and efficiency
Now we consider the issue of core stability.
LetM = (D,R,P ) = (D,R,PD, PR) be a matching market where PD is of
the same form as in 1. Let n = (nd)d∈D an assignment of financed contracts.
Definition 12 A matching µ on M is n−stable in M if it is individually
rational and if there exists no d ∈ D and no bR ⊂ Ad such that nd ≥ ¯¯¯ bR¯¯¯ > |µ(d)|
and dP rµ(r) for all r ∈ bR\µ(d).
The definition adapts to our setup the notion of stability. A matching is sta-
ble with respect to a given assignation of contracts if it satisfies two conditions.
It must be individually rational and no department can increase the number of
hired acceptable researchers with applicants who prefer to join it rather than
their current employer.
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Incomplete information mitigates the clear-cut results obtained under the
hypothesis of full information. In contrast with Theorem 1, a researcher could
apply to some department even if she is not sure to join it. Consider the case
of an applicant who beliefs that, if she got at least one preacceptance, she
would be ranked in a good position. Assume that she would like to join some
department, but she does not know with certainty if she is acceptable to it. If
she cared enough for the profession (i.e. if application costs are low enough)
she would apply. It is similar to the case in which an applicant applies to some
department despite the risk of ending unemployed. She is not sure of passing
the cut but the conditional probability of joining the department, having passed
the cut is high enough.
On departments’ side, it might happen that, for some realizations, a de-
partment has accepted more applicants than the ones it finally hires. Even if
the strategy is ex-post redundant it can be strictly optimal at departments’
information set. This behavior might cause an idoneous applicant not to be
employed. Actually, any unstable equilibrium matching results in not assigned
financed positions.
There are two causes of such instabilities. The first one we could call risk-
induced. This instability is because of applicants who would like to join a
department which otherwise would not fill all its vacancies are too low ranked
with respect to the other idoneous applicants. It comes from departments be-
cause of lack of information and risk aversion over accepted applicants. The
other form of instability is called manipulative. It derives from the rejection of
a good ranked applicant by some department, in order not to loose lower ranked
researchers. This form of instability needs more precise information: rejecting a
well ranked applicant in favor of a lower ranked one reduced the probability of a
matching with an acceptable researcher. It can emerge in a structure in which
departments’ preferences are strict. From Proposition 5 such kinds of strategies
are (weakly) dominated.
Proposition 6 Only risk-induced or manipulative instabilities can emerge at
equilibrium. In both cases at least one preaccepted and idoneous researcher is
unemployed. If departments play their essentially dominant strategy only meri-
tocratic instabilities can emerge at equilibrium otherwise. So an outcome match-
ing is stable iff it employs N researchers.
Looking at the data instabilities seems not likely to occur. All contracts in
budget (and even more) have gone assigned. An explanation is that ex-ante
information is precise. It is also likely that the mechanism itself induces agents,
mainly departments, to share the information they have on applicants and on the
ranking. The argument is that the lack of information may induce redundant
acceptances and instabilities that harm departments by reducing the number
of the researchers assigned to some departments. Voluntary disclosure of the
information can prevent such effects. Given the dimension and the structure of
the market, communication costs are lower than the ones in which departments
would incur in losing financed positions.
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5 Data and results
In this section we study the empirical evidence that supports the theoretical
findings on the mechanism associated to the first call of the Ramón y Cajal
Program. The data analyzed have been provided by the Dirección General
de Investigación of the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. We have data on
researcher’s applications and information provided by the 151 research insti-
tutions that participated in the Program. These institutions requested 2064
contracts. Most institutions have more than one research department among
the 24 scientific areas in with the applicants where divided. Once the demand
of contracts of an institution was decided, research departments played as inde-
pendent agents. The Program was designed to provide funding for a maximum
of 800 contracts. 2807 researchers applied to at least one research center and
got the preacceptances that allow then to be evaluated. Each researcher could
present at most two independent research projects. 122 researchers decided to
present two research projects. Therefore, 2939 different research projects were
presented. These projects received 3974 preacceptances.
A total of 24 Committees created by the “Agencia Nacional de Evaluación y
Prospectiva (ANEP)” (see Siune (1999)) evaluated the applicants. Overall, 341
experts took part in the evaluation. If a contract was granted to a researcher, she
could join the research departments that had preaccepted her. If more than one
research institution had preaccepted her, she would have to rank the institutions
in her application. Details on the number of preacceptances obtained by the
researchers are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: preacceptances
Number of preacceptances 1 2 3 4 5 More than 5
A pp l i c a n t s 2 2 2 9 4 8 6 1 2 4 4 5 2 4 1 4
(p e r c e n t a g e ) 7 6 .3% 1 6 .6% 4 .2% 1 .5% 0 .8% 0 .4%
G ra n t ed 5 6 2 1 5 0 3 1 1 1 1 2 8
(p e r c e n t a g e ) 7 2 .6% 1 9 .4% 4 .0% 1 .4% 1 .6% 1 .0%
Finally, 802 applicants were selected and 782 contracts signed. The first call
of the Ramón y Cajal Program served the purpose of stabilizing investigators
who had arrived recently to the Spanish system of R&D. The Program has also
incorporated 315 new researchers, of whom 104 are national of countries other
than Spain (more details about the first call of the Ramón y Cajal Program can
be found at Sanz Menéndez L. et al. (2003)).
We analyze several of the insights from our theoretical findings using the data
of the 2939 individual projects that were evaluated by the different Committees.
First, we analyze if Spanish researchers tended to (ask and) get preacceptances
from the research center where they achieved their Ph.D. This is evidence of
endogamic behavior: as general rule universities tend not to hire their own grad-
uate students. 998 researchers were preaccepted by the department where they
achieved their Ph.D. Out of the 2229 applicants with only one preacceptance,
616 were preaccepted by the research department where they achieved their
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Ph.D. Also, 158 research departments gave preacceptances only to their own
graduates. Therefore, we can infer that endogamy was present in the preac-
ceptance phase of the Ramón y Cajal Program. On Table 2 we analyze the
consequences of this behavior and we present a model where we control for the
effects of endogamy in the different research areas.
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Table 2: The Model of endogamy
D ep e n d en t Va r ia b l e : P r e a c c e p t a n c e in th e in s t i t u t io n w h e r e t h e c a n d id a t e g r a d u a t e s (Y /N )
M o d e l 1
(1)
S td .E r r . M o d e l 2
(1)
S td .E r r .
S p a n i sh r e s id e n c e 0 .2 7 7 0 .0 7 0 0 .3 2 7 0 .7 3 9
% o f p u b l ic fu n d in g o f t h e p r e f e r r e d in s t i t u t io n 1 .3 6 0 0 .1 4 3 1 .5 1 5 0 .1 5 0
N um b e r o f P r e a c c e p t a n c e s 0 .2 0 3 0 .0 2 5 0 .2 0 5 0 .0 2 7
P hy s i c a n d S p a c e S c i e n c e s 1 .6 7 1 2 .3 3 4
E a r th S c ie n c e s 1 .5 3 2 0 .3 4 5
M a t e r ia l s S c ie n c e a n d Te ch n o lo g y 1 .4 6 4 0 .3 3 5
C h em is t r y 2 .1 1 4 0 .3 6 3
C h em ic a l t e ch n o lo g y 1 .3 9 1 0 .3 3 9
P la n t a n d a n im a l b io lo g y. E c o lo g y 1 .5 9 8 0 .3 4 6
A g r ic u l t u r e 1 .0 1 0 0 .3 5 9
L iv e s t o ck a n d fi s h in g 1 .0 7 9 0 .3 5 1
Fo o d S c i e n c e a n d t e ch n o lo g y 1 .4 5 2 0 .3 3 1
M o le c u la r a n d c e l lu la r B io lo g y a n d g e n e t i c s 1 .6 8 9 0 .3 4 4
P hy s io lo g y a n d P h a rm a c o lo g y 1 .7 5 7 0 .3 4 4
M ed ic in e 1 .3 0 0 0 .4 8 8
M e ch a n ic a l , S h ip a n d A e ro n a u t i c a l E n g in e e r in g 1 .1 7 0 0 .4 4 6
E le c t r ic a l a n d E le c t r o n i c E n g in e e r in g a n d R o b o t i c s 1 .4 5 4 0 .4 2 3
C iv i l E n g in e e r in g a n d a r ch i t e c t u r e 1 .9 3 7 0 .3 6 9
M a th em a t ic s 1 .2 1 4 0 .4 7 8
C om p u t e r S c ie n c e s 0 .5 1 2 0 .4 0 8
In f o rm a t io n & C om m un ic a t io n Te ch n o lo g i e s 1 .1 2 9 0 .4 5 3
E c o n om ic s - -
L aw 1 .6 7 0 0 .3 9 9
S o c ia l S c ie n c e s 0 .6 9 2 0 .4 0 3
P sy ch o lo g y a n d E d u c a t io n S c i e n c e s 1 .4 5 6 0 .3 5 8
P h i lo lo g y a n d P h i lo s o p h y 1 .3 5 1 0 .3 4 6
H is to r y a n d A r t 1 .7 7 6 0 .3 5 2
Model 1 Model 2
L o g L ik e l ih o o d -1 7 4 0 .7 6 -1 6 4 6 .8 1
N um b e r o f o b s e r va t io n s 2 8 2 3 2 8 2 3
L R t e s t s fo r jo in t s ig n ifi c a n c e o f s lo p e s 1 6 0 .0 8 0 .0 0 0 1 6 4 .0 7 0 .0 0 0
L R t e s t s fo r jo in t s ig n ifi c a n c e o f A r e a D um m y 1 6 2 .8 4 0 .0 0 0
( 1 ) M a x im um L ike l ih o o d e s t im a te s fo r p r o b it e s t im a t e s .
On Table 2, we present two probit regressions over a variable that has value
one if a research project has requested and achieved a preacceptance in a research
center were the researcher achieved her Ph.D. Notice that in the data set there
is a group of research centers that cannot be endogamic by definition. This
is because they cannot provide Ph.D.s and therefore cannot preaccept and,
eventually, hire their own Ph.D. graduates. We consider a variable that collects
the percentage of public funding of the institutions preferred by the applicant
for her project among those that preaccepted her. Public research centers as
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public universities can obtain private funds through research contracts with the
private sector. We can infer that a researcher increases the chances to ask for
and get a preacceptance from the center where she achieved her Ph.D. as the
share of public funding of the institution increases. Finally, the chances to incur
in endogamy increase with the number of preacceptance. This means that the
research centers are viewed as entry points into the research career for their
graduates. Therefore, if a graduate considers to apply to more than one center
she includes the center where she graduates. It is worth to notice that 261 of
the finally selected applicants, have been preaccepted by the research centers
where they obtained their Ph.D. and 198 of them have only the preacceptances
of these centers. We can conclude that in the first call of the Ramón y Cajal
Program the Spanish research institutions have a tendency to preaccept their
former Ph.D. Students. In addition, this is more likely as the share of private
funding decreases. In our second model we can see how area dummies control,
among other things, for the probability to incur in endogamic behavior. We use
Economics as reference area because is the one that contributes less to increase
the probability of endogamy.
We have considered the problem of endogamy and proved that the mech-
anism is not able to prevent it. Another variable can give us more insights
about our theoretical results. Although we have no direct information from the
applicants’ curricula we can model the scores given by the different evaluating
committees to the projects presented by the applicants. The model is presented
in Table 3. The applicants with more preacceptances and US residents get
better scores; notice that this also applies to Spaniards resident in the US for
doctoral or postdoctoral training. To have achieved her Ph.D. in Spain or to
present more than one research project influences negatively the score achieved
by the applicant. The difference between the scores induced by these variables
goes from 2 to 8 points over a hundred.
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Table 3: The Model of scores
D ep e n d en t Va r ia b l e : S c o r e ( 1 -1 0 0 )
M o d e l 1 S td .E r r . M o d e l 2 S td .E r r . E n d o g am y S td .E r r .
M o r e th a n o n e r e s e a r ch p ro je c t - 4 .5 5 7 1 .4 3 9 -4 .5 8 3 1 .3 9 2 -6 .0 3 6 2 .1 5 5
U S r e s id e n c e 8 .7 2 5 1 .7 4 0 8 .2 2 2 1 .6 8 2 2 .0 0 9 3 .0 6 6
S p a n i sh P h .D . -2 .9 2 0 1 .0 2 5 -3 .3 0 7 1 .0 2 7 - -
C o n s t a n t 6 4 .3 8 - - - -
P hy s i c a n d S p a c e S c i e n c e s 7 4 .5 8 4 1 .4 5 2 7 5 .5 7 7 1 .7 9 1
E a r th S c ie n c e s 6 3 .5 0 5 1 .8 2 1 6 0 .3 4 8 2 .5 9 0
M a t e r ia l s S c ie n c e a n d Te ch n o lo g y 6 6 .8 2 6 1 .8 0 0 6 5 .3 7 8 2 .7 2 4
C h em is t r y 6 6 .6 5 4 1 .4 8 1 6 5 .2 7 1 1 .4 6 4
C h em ic a l t e ch n o lo g y 6 4 .7 9 2 2 .3 9 2 6 2 .8 0 1 4 .0 5 1
P la n t a n d a n im a l b io lo g y. E c o lo g y 6 7 .1 5 8 1 .6 6 1 6 5 .2 9 4 2 .1 2 5
A g r ic u l t u r e 6 6 .4 2 4 1 .7 8 6 6 5 .6 6 0 3 .3 1 4
L iv e s t o ck a n d fi s h in g 6 3 .1 5 7 2 .2 3 1 6 2 .0 1 2 4 .1 2 0
Fo o d S c i e n c e a n d t e ch n o lo g y 6 1 .3 5 4 2 .1 1 7 6 1 .4 1 9 3 .1 2 4
M o le c u la r a n d c e l lu la r B io lo g y a n d g e n e t i c s 6 3 .9 9 2 1 .2 6 2 6 2 .0 9 1 1 .3 0 2
P hy s io lo g y a n d P h a rm a c o lo g y 6 6 .5 9 6 1 .8 3 4 6 6 .0 7 2 2 .3 6 8
M ed ic in e 6 1 .8 8 0 1 .7 9 3 5 7 .8 4 4 2 .8 1 4
M e ch a n ic a l , S h ip a n d A e ro n a u t i c a l E n g in e e r in g 6 0 .8 7 7 4 .6 2 8 3 8 .0 0 0 1 0 .4 5 8
E le c t r ic a l a n d E le c t r o n i c E n g in e e r in g a n d R o b o t i c s 6 5 .8 9 9 4 .3 0 0 6 5 .0 0 6 7 .4 0 3
C iv i l E n g in e e r in g a n d a r ch i t e c t u r e 5 3 .9 5 2 4 .2 2 9 4 2 .8 8 8 6 .0 3 7
M a th em a t ic s 7 0 .9 1 2 2 .5 1 5 7 4 .0 5 1 3 .9 5 8
C om p u t e r S c ie n c e s 5 1 .5 5 7 3 .4 8 2 3 4 .0 0 0 1 2 .8 0 8
In f o rm a t io n & C om m un ic a t io n Te ch n o lo g i e s 6 2 .9 2 1 3 .0 8 7 6 4 .0 0 0 7 .3 9 4
E c o n om ic s 7 0 .7 8 1 2 .7 1 1 4 0 .0 0 0 1 2 .8 0 8
L aw 5 6 .2 0 6 4 .9 3 4 4 9 .2 0 0 6 .8 4 6
S o c ia l S c ie n c e s 3 0 .5 1 2 2 .7 9 4 2 0 .0 0 0 7 .3 9 4
P sy ch o lo g y a n d E d u c a t io n S c i e n c e s 5 2 .7 2 4 3 .6 5 0 5 2 .7 0 3 5 .7 3 2
P h i lo lo g y a n d P h i lo s o p h y 6 1 .2 9 4 2 .2 6 8 6 6 .4 8 1 3 .4 8 6
H is to r y a n d A r t 6 2 .9 6 4 1 .9 5 9 5 8 .7 7 4 2 .5 3 6
Model 1 Prb.>F. Model 2 Prb.>F. Endogamy Prb.>F.
N um b e r o f o b s e r va t io n s 2 9 0 6 2 9 0 6 9 8 6
F t e s t s fo r jo in t s i g n ifi c a n c e o f s l o p e s 1 4 .7 8 0 .0 0 0 1 5 .5 1 0 .0 0 0 4 .2 0 0 .0 1 5
χ2 t e s t s fo r e q u a l i ty o f A r e a d um m ie s 2 9 4 .6 3 0 .0 0 0 1 3 5 2 .7 6 0 .0 0 0
The most relevant characteristic of the scores is their variation among the
different research areas. This variation cannot be attributed to the fact that
each area has a different evaluating committee. The evaluation criteria and the
coordination standards prevent them to diverge in their valuation. The criteria
were based on evaluation of academic contributions (publications, patents, etc.
and using standard citations index for the different areas, up to 60 points),
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potential of the applicant (up to 20 points) and merits including postdoctoral
studies in international research centers (up to 20 points). Another natural
source of these results is the different quality of the applicants. The score
was based on academic achievements, therefore it is independent of the ratio
applicant/position in the different areas and on the total number of applicants.
The contracts were granted only to applicants that were excellent according to
the evaluation criteria. There were 1006 applicants qualified as excellent and
in all areas there were more excellent applicants than contracts available. In
fact, the number of contracts had to be increased from 800 to 802 because of
unbreakable ties.
Then, if there were excellent applicants in all areas and the average points
are significantly different, it can be due only to different degrees of difficulty
to get a preacceptance in the different areas. This possibility of the research
centers to include or not applicants during the selection process is highlighted
by our theoretical results and, from Table 3, there is evidence that it has been
used. We compare Model 2 in Table 3 with the Endogamy Model. In the
latter, we include only the researchers that applied to the centers where they
had obtained their Ph.D. We can see how the scores are generically smaller and
very different among some areas. We do not know if the research departments
have succeeded in prevent some agents from taking part to the selection but it
is clear that many departments where willing to preaccept low qualified local
applicants.
Finally, we want to test the results of our theoretical model on how infor-
mation conditions the behavior of the applicants. We use an ordered probit to
analyze the relation between the number of preacceptances and the character-
istics of the researchers, that we assume to be related with their information
about the Spanish institutions. We claim that the information of a resident in
Spain is more precise than the one of an outsider and therefore the former will
seek preacceptances in fewer institutions than the latter, given that this is costly
and time-consuming. In this sense we claim that those researchers whose resi-
dence is in Spain or has been previously in Spain shall have better information
than a researcher without this background.
In Table 4 we present the main results of the empirical part. A Spanish
residence decreases the number of preacceptances an applicant well seek and get.
If the applicant has achieved her Ph.D. in US she will seek more preacceptances.
Notice that once an applicant has been preaccepted by a center she likes, her
only source of uncertainty arises from the selection process. In fact, of the 782
contracts that were finally signed, 732 were signed with the applicant first choice
and the 96.16 % of them in the first matching round. Therefore, the reason to
increase the number of preacceptances for the same project, as it happened in
23.7 % of the cases, lies in the uncertainty about the possibility of getting to
sign the contract once granted. This uncertainty can only be caused by lack of
information about the demand of the centers. This can be seen in Table 4, the
positive and negative coefficients of those who obtain their Ph.D. in the US and
those who have Spanish residence can be understood as actions of persons with
different level of information on the agents involved in the process. The results
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confirm the insights provided by the model with incomplete information.
Table 4: The Model of number of total preacceptances
D ep e n d en t Va r ia b l e : N um b e r o f p r e a c c e p t a n c e s ( 1 -5 o r m o r e )
M o d e l 1
(1)
S td .E r r . M o d e l 2
(1)
S td .E r r .
S p a n i sh r e s id e n c e - 0 .2 7 9 0 .0 6 3 -0 .2 0 3 0 .0 6 5
U S P h .D . 0 .4 4 8 0 .1 3 5 0 .3 7 8 0 .1 4 0
M o r e th a n o n e r e s e a r ch p ro je c t 1 .5 8 2 0 .0 7 6 1 .7 2 4 0 .0 7 8
A p p ly t o th e r e s e a r ch in s t i t u t io n w h e r e s h e a ch i e v e h e r P h .D . 0 .5 1 0 0 .0 5 0 0 .5 0 4 0 .0 5 1
P hy s i c a n d S p a c e S c i e n c e s 1 .9 5 2 0 .4 5 4
A r e a E a r th S c i e n c e s 1 .0 0 0 0 .4 6 3
M a t e r ia l s S c ie n c e a n d Te ch n o lo g y 1 .3 1 6 0 .4 5 9
C h em is t r y 1 .0 6 2 0 .4 5 5
C h em ic a l t e ch n o lo g y 0 .6 1 8 0 .4 8 8
P la n t a n d a n im a l b io lo g y. E c o lo g y 1 .3 0 1 0 .4 5 8
A g r ic u l t u r e 1 .2 1 3 0 .4 6 1
L iv e s t o ck a n d fi s h in g 0 .8 8 7 0 .4 7 4
Fo o d S c i e n c e a n d t e ch n o lo g y 1 .2 7 9 0 .4 6 5
M o le c u la r a n d c e l lu la r B io lo g y a n d g e n e t i c s 1 .2 1 8 0 .4 5 2
P hy s io lo g y a n d P h a rm a c o lo g y 1 .3 0 9 0 .4 6 0
M ed ic in e 0 .7 9 0 0 .4 6 3
M e ch a n ic a l , S h ip a n d A e ro n a u t i c a l E n g in e e r in g 1 .1 6 5 0 .5 5 1
E le c t r ic a l a n d E le c t r o n i c E n g in e e r in g a n d R o b o t i c s 1 .5 4 5 0 .5 2 4
C iv i l E n g in e e r in g a n d a r ch i t e c t u r e - -
M a th em a t ic s 2 .2 1 6 0 .4 7 0
C om p u t e r S c ie n c e s 1 .2 2 2 0 .5 0 6
In f o rm a t io n & C om m un ic a t io n Te ch n o lo g i e s 0 .8 6 7 0 .5 1 3
E c o n om ic s 0 .9 9 8 0 .4 9 4
L aw 0 .9 6 3 0 .5 7 8
S o c ia l S c ie n c e s 1 .4 2 2 0 .4 8 3
P sy ch o lo g y a n d E d u c a t io n S c i e n c e s 1 .2 4 1 0 .5 0 4
P h i lo lo g y a n d P h i lo s o p h y 1 .6 3 8 0 .4 6 8
H is to r y a n d A r t 0 .9 4 7 0 .4 6 8
Model 1 Model 2
L o g L ik e l ih o o d -2 3 8 8 .5 9 -2 2 8 3 .0 1
N um b e r o f o b s e r va t io n s 2 9 1 4 2 9 1 4
L R t e s t s fo r jo in t s ig n ifi c a n c e o f s lo p e s 5 4 4 .3 3 0 .0 0 0 5 5 5 .1 0 0 .0 0 0
L R t e s t s fo r jo in t s ig n ifi c a n c e o f A r e a D um m y 2 0 6 .5 4 0 .0 0 0
(1) Maximum Likelihood estimates for ordered probit estimates.
If we consider the results on Table 2 and the data on Table 1 we can infer
that this can be because most applicants present only one preacceptance. This
preacceptance suits to the institution they are working in and it is given by the
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institution regardless of the quality of the applicant. Nevertheless, on Table 1
we have shown how 76.3% of researchers present only one research project and
receive only one preacceptance. Therefore, we can show that the uncertainty was
higher for those out of the system but there where few of then in the allocation
process. Most of the applicants who achieved a research contract on the first
call of the Program were Spaniards. In fact, 75% of the 698 Spaniards awarded
with contracts were living in Spain at the time of the application. From the 104
foreigners 36 of then (5% of the total contracts) were living in Spain.
6 Conclusions
Successful mechanism design should take into account agent’s motives in order
to provide them with the right incentives to perform its goals. The Ramón y
Cajal Program was created to improve Spanish scientific researchers’ base by
promoting the recruiting of top-researchers while preserving the autonomy of
research institutions. The model we have presented provides insights on the way
these two objectives have interacted in the design of the assigning mechanisms.
As a result we got a design failure. The limits to recruit Spanish scientists
came from the lack of a merit criterion caused mainly by endogamous behav-
ior. The objective of the mechanism was to induce departments to accept high
quality researchers.
So the meritocratic concerns resulted in the selection of applicants, which
had been taken far from concerned departments, and in giving better applicants
priority. On the other hand, to preserve researcher centers’ independence a
preliminary acceptance phase was introduced. The interacting of these two
features produced large possibility of collusion between applicants and research
centers. Large information asymmetries seem able to prevent such collusion.
The analysis of the data confirms the theoretical findings. Most of applicants
have fewer preacceptances and were preaccepted by the research centers where
they obtained their Ph.D. On the informational side, insiders seem likely to
present fewer applications than non-Spanish resident, which confirms the results
in Section 4. Further, the quality of the applicant has little correlation with the
number of preacceptances achieved.
We can attribute the redesign of the mechanism to the failures that it pre-
sented. In the redesign, the preacceptance stage has been removed. Therefore,
all applicants are considered by the evaluation committees. Also, the matching
has been decentralized and any priority has been removed.
The new design of the mechanism is an improvement. However, it does not
guarantee that departments are competing for the best researchers. It only can
assure the over all quality of the applicants selected.
An interesting point for future research, both theoretical and empirical, is the
evolution of the agents’ behavior through the different calls of the Program. The
data on the other calls could also help in clarifying the role of the applicants
that were granted a contract but decided to abandon the Program. Of the
selected applicants 732 signed a contracts with the institution they preferred
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and only 16 used the second round of the mechanism and signed contract with
a research center that initially did not preaccept then. This supports the idea
of a reasonably complete information environment, but it precludes testing this
hypothesis.
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8 Appendix A
We prove Proposition 4 under a more general assumption on the decentralized
mechanism beginning in the second stage.
Condition 2 Let z be an initial node of the second stage. Let R0 = R(z2) be
the set of idoneous researchers. Any SPE outcome of the decentralized matching
starting at z is stable in (D,R(z), Pn(z), PR0) students.
We now prove Proposition 4 in a more general form, changing the claim to
take into account Condition 2
Proposition 7 Assume Condition 2 holds. Let T = r1, ..., rN , ..., rf and let ν
be stable in (D,R,Pn).
(i) At any SPE of the new mechanism no more than `ν(D) researchers are
employed.
(ii) `ν(D) > N and let µ be a matching in which exactly N researchers are
employed. Let rj∗ be the worst ranked employed researcher. Let j∗ > N . Then
µ is an SPE outcome of the new mechanism if and only if µ is a SPE outcome at
zµ where zµ is the subgame induced by each department d accepting only agents
in µ(d) and if for all j < j∗ such that µ(rj) = rj, rj is single in the stable set
of (D,R(zµ)\ {rj∗}) ∪ {rj} , PnD(zµ, Pn(µ(D)\{rj∗})∪{rj}).
(iii) Let µ be a matching in which N 0 < N researchers are employed. Then µ
is a SPE outcome at zµ where zµ is the subgame induced by each department d
accepting only agents in µ(d) for (D,R(zµ) ∪ {rj} , PnD(zµ, Pn(µ(D)∪{rj}).
(iv)If `ν(D) > N and each researcher has positive application costs, exactly N
researchers are employed at equilibrium. The set of SPE coincides with the set
of matchings described in (ii)
(iv)Let `ν(D) ≤ N and assume that each researcher has positive application
costs. Then the set of SPE at (D,R,P ) is the set of SPE outcomes of the
decentralized matching process characterized starting at R1(z) = ν(D).
Proof. (i) The proof is trivial.
(ii) Let µ and j∗ as in the claim and set R0 = µ(D). Let j < j∗ such that
µ is an SPE outcome of the new mechanism if and only by participating to
the selection, no such rj can get a position. By deciding to participate j < j∗
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would result idoneous. Let z(j) be the subgame induced by such a deviation.
R0(j) = (R0\ {rj∗}) ∪ {rj}. The matching µ is a SPE if and only if rj is single
as result of such a deviation. From Condition 2 and Martinez and al (2000)
follows (ii) part of the claim.
(iii) is proven as (ii).
(v) follows from (ii) once observed that with positive application costs, at
equilibrium, no unmatched agent applies.
(iv) follows from (ii) once observed that with positive application costs, at
equilibrium, no unmatched agent applies.
9 Appendix B
Let (h, s) be a path in the game and let σ−d be a profile of strategies for players
other than d.
Let Rd(h, s, σ−d) = A(d, s) ∩Rd1(h, s, σ−d) be the set of acceptable applica-
tion received by d.
Let R−d(s, σ−d) = cRd(h, s, σ−d) ∪ " S
d0 6=d
Rd
0
2 (h, s, σ
−d)
#
= {r1, ..., rl}, where
r1T....T rl. R−d(s, σ−d) is the set of researchers that would be preaccepted at
state s if d accepted only its acceptable applicants.
Consider the following algorithm.
Let d1 = maxP r1
©
d : r1 ∈ R−d(h, s, σ−d)
ª
and let
dj+1 = maxP rj+1 (s)
©
d : rj ∈ R2(d, h, s), |{0 ≤ k ≤ j − 1 : d = dj−k}| < nd
ª
.
Let µ(h, s, σ−d)(rj) = dj and let µ(h, s, σ−d)(r) = r for all other r.
Let σ(h, s, σ−d)(d) = µ(h, s, σ−d)(d) for all (h, s) and set Rd2(I
d, σ−d)(d) =S
πd(h,s|Id,σ−d)(d)>0
σ(h, s, σ−d)(d).
We call σ(Id, σ−d)(d) the secure strategy against σ−d at Id. The secure
strategy against σ−d amounts in accepting acceptable researchers that with pos-
itive probability will join d at the following stage. Playing secure strategy assure
the best ranked ones.
Then it is the best each department can do if it only cares to fill all its
position, whatever information it owns. Formally:
Lemma 4 Let d ∈ D. Let σ−d be a profile of strategies for players other than
d, in which researchers play according to the strategies described in Proposition
1. Using the secure strategy profile at Id against is σ−d sequentially rational for
d at Id. And the secure strategy maximizes the number of researchers can get
at each state.
Proof. Let πd(h, s | Id, σ−d)(d) > 0. Accepting any R2 ⊃ σd2(h, s, σ−d)(d)
matches d with all the agents in µ(h, s, σ−d)(d) = σ(h, s, σ−d)(d). So we can
consider subsets of R1(d, Id) such that σ(Id, σ−d)\R2 6= ∅. In particular, for
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some (h, s) such that πd(h, s | Id, σ−d)(d) > 0 σ(h, s, σ−d)(d)\R2 6= ∅. It suf-
fices to show that for any such (h, s) accepting such R2 does not increase the
cardinality of µ(h, s)(d) where µ(h, s) denotes the outcome function at (h, s),
fixed σ−d. We can assume also that R2\σ(Id, σ−d) 6= ∅ and that R2 contains
only acceptable researchers. Let µ0 be the outcome matching after (h, s) when
d plays her secure strategy and let µ be the outcome matching. after (h, s)
when d accepts the researchers in R2. µ0(d) = σ(h, s, σ
−d)(d). As the out-
come for d after (h, s)is the same if d accepts R2 and if it accepts µ(d) we
can assume that µ(d) = R2(d). Let µ0(d)\R2 = { br1, ..., brs}, br1T...T brs and let
µ1(d)\µ0(d) = {r1, ..., rp} r1T...T rp. Observe that it must be the case thatbr1Tr1, by construction of σ(Id, σ−d). Consider the following algorithm. Let µ0
be the outcome matching when d accepts the researchers in µ0(d) ∪ R2. For
1 ≤ j ≤ s: Step j: Rj = µj−1(d) ∪ R2\
©
\rs−j+1
ª
. Let µj be the outcome
matching when d accepts the researchers in Rj . We have µs = µ. Accepting
µ0(d) ∪ R2 matches d with µ0(d). We now prove that
¯¯
µj+1(d)
¯¯
≤
¯¯
µj(d)
¯¯
for
all 0 ≤ j ≤ s. First of all observe that µj−1(\rs−j+1) = d. Rejecting \rs−j+1
at step j does not affect the choices of applicants ranked above \rs−j+1. This
rejection can create at most one cycle of rejections interesting only lower ranked
applicants. Then d is matched at most with one applicant different than \rs−j+1
at each step. So
¯¯
µj+1(d)
¯¯
≤
¯¯
µj(d)
¯¯
and |µ(d)| = |µs(d)| ≤ ¯¯µ0(d)¯¯.
In general not only supersets of the secure strategies are best responses with
respect to a given strategy. From the proof of Lemma 4 follows that are someway
robust to changes in the information setup. Playing different strategies means
to believe in the possibility of a matching with low ranked applicants. But lower
ranked applicants have in general lower probability of passing the “cut”.
Proof of Proposition 5. It follows from Lemma 4 and Remark 3.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let σ∗ be an equilibrium and let µ∗ = µ∗(s, T )
be the equilibrium outcome matching at state (s, T ). Let d ∈ D and letbR ⊂ A(d, s) such that nd ≥ ¯¯¯ bR¯¯¯ > |µ∗(d)| and dP r(s)µ∗(r) for all r ∈ bR\µ∗(d)..
At equilibrium |µ∗(d)| is the maximum number of researchers d can get at (s, T )
against σ∗−d (from Lemma 4). Let r ∈ bR\µ∗(d) such that ¯¯¯¯½r0 ∈ S
d0
A2(d0, s, I∗d
0
) : r0Tr
¾¯¯¯¯
<
N . Consider first the case in which r applied to d. By contradiction, sup-
pose r0Tr for all r0 ∈ µ∗(d). Consider the following deviation for d: accepts
µ∗(d) ∪ {r}. It would match d with µ∗(d) ∪ {r} at (T, s). But it contradicts
Lemma 4:it would follows that d could obtain at least |µ∗(d)|+1 researchers by
playing its secure strategy against σ∗−d. Now consider the case in which r did
not applied to d. Consider the following deviation for r: applies to the same
departments as in σ∗d and to d. It changes the information set of no department
but d. Starting from such path d can get at least |µ∗(d)| researchers at (T, s).
As costs are small it must be the case that d is not matched with r as result
of such deviation. If. it was not the case applying also to d would increase r’s
probability of better matchings. Then d can get at most |µ∗(d)|. By contra-
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diction, assume that r0Tr for all r0 ∈ µ∗(d). Accepting only µ∗(d) ∪ {r} would
procure |µ∗(d)|+1 researchers which, via Lemma 4, constitutes a contradiction.
The last part of the claim follows by observing that d has a vacancy at (s, T ).
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